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Abstract
We consider location-then-price game as a two stage game of n players on the graph. Logit analysis is used to model demand
distribution between competitors. The use of multinomial logit model allows to compute shares in case of n players and proceed
with studying price equilibrium. Price and location equilibria are constructed using best response dynamics. We apply proposed
model to Russian and Chinese airline markets and find location and price equilibria for competitive airlines.
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1. Introduction
We consider a market where the customers are distributed in the vertexes of a transportation graph. The edges of the
graph are transportation links (railways, car and air lines, etc.). The vertexes are the hubs (bus stops, airports, railway
stations, etc.). The customers are the passengers, who use this kind of transportation. The demand is determined by
the flow of passengers. There are n companies (players), who make a service in this market. First, players form their
transportation networks, and then they announce the prices for the service. The objective of a player is to maximize
the payoﬀ. We derive the equilibrium in this non-cooperative game. We apply proposed model to Russian and Chinese
airline markets and find location and price equilibria for competitive airlines.
In a competitive environment an airline makes a strategic decision on how to allocate planes among available
routes. Starting operations on chosen routes airlines compete for passengers using ticket prices.
Location-then-price competition was first introduced by Hotelling1. This classical model examines behavior for
two firms producing a single good on a line segment. Passenger demand depends on the firm’s price and transportation
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costs. Hotelling found price equilibrium and raised a problem of firms competitive location. Extensions to Hotelling’s
duopoly were studied in several directions2,3,4,5.
In this paper we examine location-then-price Hotelling model on the graph for the case of n ≥ 2 players. We
apply the theoretical results to study competition in airline market, where airlines first decide plane allocation and
then choose ticket prices.
2. Location Game on Graph
There are n companies (players), who make a service in the market presented by transportation graph G(V, E). A
service is possible only if there is a link e j ∈ E between two vertexes in graph G(V, E). The demand is determined by
the number of customers in vertexes v1, v2 ∈ V connected by the link e j
d(e j) = d(v1, v2), e j = (v1, v2).
Assume, that player i has mi units of a resource. He distributes the resource among links in graph G(V, E). Suppose,
that each player i distributes all mi units of resource and forms transportation network Ei, which is a subset of the links
in graph G(V, E).
The demand on the link e j is distributed between players. Each of them makes a service of the part Mi j of the
customers on this link. Players announce prices for the service on the link e j. The part of customers, which prefer the
service of player i, depends on the price pi j and the prices of other players on this link
Mi j = Mi j(pi j, {pr j}r∈Nj\{i}), |Mi j| ≤ 1,
where Nj - number of the rival players on the link e j.
The number of customers who prefer the service i on the link e j is
S i j({pr j}r∈Nj ) = Mi j(pi j, {pr j}r∈Nj\{i})d(e j).
Let xi j be a distribution of player i on the link e j, i.e. xi j = 1 if e j ∈ Ei, and 0, otherwise.
Player i with mi units of the resource on graph G(V, E) can attract customers, whose number equals
S i =
|E|∑
j=1
Mi j(pi j, {pr j}r∈Nj\{i})d(e j)xi j.
The gain of player i on the link e j depends on the price for the service and the share in the customer demand
hi j({pr j}r∈Nj ) = pi jMi j(pi j, {pr j}r∈Nj\{i})d(e j).
Denote by ci j the costs of player i on the link e j. The costs are proportional to the number of customers, who use
the resource. Then the payoﬀ of player i on graph G(V, E) is
Hi({pr}r∈N , {xr}r∈N) =
|E|∑
j=1
(
hi j(pi j, {pr j}r∈Nj\{i}) − ci jS i j(pi j, {pr j}r∈Nj\{i})
)
xi j,
where pr is a vector of prices of player r in his network Er and xr is a vector, which defines allocation of mr units
of the resource on graph G(V, E) (r ∈ N).
First, players form their transportation networks, and then they announce the prices for the service. The objective
of a player is to maximize the payoﬀ.
We determine the non-cooperative game ΓG for n players. Strategy of player i is a pair of vectors (xi, pi). Player
determines the allocation xi of mi units of the resource,
∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , |E|} : xi j ∈ {0, 1},
|E|∑
r=1
xir = mi.
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Then player i announces the prices in his network Ei
pi j ∈ [0,∞), e j ∈ Ei.
We seek the Nash equilibrium {x∗i }i∈N , i.e. x∗i such that ∀ xi, i ∈ N it satisfies the condition
Hi
(
{p˜r(xi, {x∗r }r∈N\{i})}r∈N , xi, {x∗r }r∈N\{i}
)
≤ Hi
(
{p˜r(x∗i , {x∗r }r∈N\{i})}r∈N , x∗i , {x∗r }r∈N\{i}
)
,
where {p˜r({xi}i∈N)}r∈N is an equilibrium in price game for fixed resource distribution on graph G(V, E).
For fixed resource allocation {x˜r}r∈N we find the Nash equilibrium {p∗i }i∈N , i.e. p∗i such that ∀ pi, i ∈ N holds
Hi
(
pi, {p∗r }r∈N\{i}, {x˜r}r∈N
)
≤ Hi
(
p∗i , {p
∗
r }r∈N\{i}, {x˜r}r∈N
)
.
3. Price Game On Graph
Consider the number of players Nj, who choose the link e j in graph G(V, E). Player i ∈ Nj announces the price pi j
for the service on the link e j. Suppose that demand d(e j) is distributed among services in the logistic manner. Then
Mi j = e
αpi j+(a,vi )
|N j |∑
s=1
e
αps j+(a,vs )+eρ
, e j ∈ Ei, i ∈ Nj,
where vi - a vector of characteristics of the service i, α < 0, a - a constant vector of weights, ρ corresponds to the
customers, who prefer not to use any service at all.
On the link e j we obtain price game of Nj players with the payoﬀs
hi j({pr j}r∈Nj ) = (pi j − ci j)Mi jd(e j), i ∈ Nj.
Let’s denote by {p∗i j}i∈N j an equilibrium in price game. It can be found as a solution of the system of equations
∂hi j
∂pi j
= 0.
Imagine, that a new player appears on the link e j. Denote by γ a new player and consider the new set of players on
the link e j ˜Nj = Nj ∪ {γ}. Let {p˜∗i j}i∈ ˜N j be an equilibrium in the price game with additional player.
Theorem 1. In the price game with additional player the equilibrium prices and optimal payoﬀs for all players
except the new one are decreasing, i.e. ∀ i ∈ Nj : p∗i j > p˜∗i j.
Let’s return to location game. On the first stage the players distrubute their resources among links. After resource
allocation price game takes place on each link and the players receive some payoﬀs. We obtain in Theorem 1, that
these payoﬀs are decreasing functions in the number of players choosing the same link. The game of this type is a so
called congestion game.
Theorem 2. If the strategy sets are satisfied to condition: |Ei| = constant ∀i, then in game ΓG it exists the
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Equilibrium point can be found as a result of best response process.
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4. Competition in Airline Networks
Let V be a finite set of airports and let E be a finite set of routes between airports. Under route we mean, that any
airline can perform operations between these two airports. An undirected graph G(V, E) represents possible routes
between airports in airline market.
An airline is considered as a player in the market. Each airline i allocates mi planes among routes in G(V, E). Let’s
define xi as an airline allocation vector and Ei as an airline route network.
Each route e j in G(V, E) is characterized by potential passenger demand d(e j). Airline share in route passenger
demand Mi j depends on airline own price pi j and prices of competitive airlines. For simplicity, we assume that airline
operating costs on the route e j are proportional to passenger demand.
We study Nash equilibrium for allocation vectors {xi}i∈N , knowing that in the second stage of the game players
choose prices {pi}i∈N from Nash equilibrium for fixed airline networks on graph G(V, E). We illustrate presented
model with an application to Russian and Chinese airline markets.
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